Sebastián Bauer

Welcome!

I am an Assistant Professor in Economics at Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, working in Industrial Organization, Market Design and Urban Economics.

I was born in Germany but I grew up in Argentina, where I received a BA in Economics from Universidad de Buenos Aires in 2016 and an MA in Economics from Universidad Torcuato Di Tella in 2019. I received my PhD in Economic Analysis & Policy from Stanford GSB in 2026.

You can reach me at sebauer@stanford.edu.

Working Papers

Abstract: Airlines require landing and takeoff slots in order to serve congested airports. Currently, airlines are allocated slots for free and have to use them at least 80% of the time to keep them. A frequent proposal is to replace this system with auctions and eliminate the minimum usage requirement. To evaluate the welfare impact of the current system, I build and estimate a structural model of airline demand and route choice using EU data. My main counterfactual compares the status quo to an approximation of the outcome under an auction. I find that the minimum usage requirement leads airlines to increase the total number of flights they offer. This behavior exacerbates congestion, but it also increases competition and the number of available varieties to consumers, thereby increasing total welfare. The current system's pro-competitive effect means that total welfare is actually lower under the auction, although this result reverses if the social cost of carbon is high enough. My results highlight that reforms prioritizing allocative efficiency over the current mechanism's pro-competitive properties risk substantial harm to consumers.
[SSRN]
2026 Claire and Ralph Landau Student Discussion Paper Prize, SIEPR
EC'26 Exemplary Paper Award

Abstract: I study the effects of aftermarket deterrence on participation and efficiency in essential input auctions. A set of entrants simultaneously chooses whether to participate in an auction for an essential input. This essential input implicitly grants entry rights into an aftermarket. The aftermarket has an incumbent who sees the auction winner and has to choose whether to attempt to deter this entrant or not. Since the incumbent does not know the entrants' costs, the entrants and the incumbent play a signaling game where the incumbent can learn from the entrants' auction participation decision. I characterize this game's unique equilibrium outcome, and show that some entrants always opt not to participate in equilibrium. I show that the incumbent's presence leads to auction winners with higher marginal costs. My results match existing evidence on auction participation in various essential input markets, such as those for airport slots, electromagnetic spectrum, and natural resources.

Abstract: We study how the saliency of past authoritarian regimes affects privacy concerns, leveraging Germany’s strong culture of Holocaust remembrance. We use detailed street-level data from Berlin to show the effect of Stolpersteine—individual memorials for victims of Nazi persecution—on privacy concerns, measured as blurring requests on Google Street View. To isolate causality, we leverage the quasi-random variation in Stolpersteine location after controlling for victim agglomeration patterns around each address. We show that Stolpersteine cause a localized increase in blurring, with the effect concentrating within 10 meters of a Stolperstein. We also find that Stolpersteine seen while commuting increase blurring. Furthermore, through an experimental survey we show that when Germans are primed to think about the Stolpersteine and Nazi persecution, they respond by spending more time on the experiment’s final consent form. This experimental design together with our blurring measure constitute two novel measures of privacy concerns.

2022 Sean Buckley Memorial Award for Best Second-Year Paper, Stanford University, Dept. of Economics

Abstract: We study exploding offers by considering the strategic interaction between a low-tier firm and a set of workers within a large job market. Each worker has a private value for the firm and may receive offers from preferred top-tier firms according to an exogenous stochastic process. We show that more risk averse workers receive offers with shorter deadlines, and that there is a level of risk aversion beyond which a worker only receives offers that expire as soon as possible—independently of what all other firms are doing. If workers are sufficiently risk averse, the workers’ expected welfare is maximized if and only if exploding offers are banned. Finally, any minimal offer length that does not ban exploding offers may lead to workers falling through the cracks. All results are robust to a range of sequentially-rational strategies for the workers. Our predictions match existing evidence and have implications for policies regulating exploding offers.

Publications

Buyers' Welfare Maximizing Auction Design. International Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 52 (2), pp. 555-567 (2023).

Abstract: I derive the incentive compatible and individually rational mechanism that maximizes the sum of the buyers' ex-ante expected utilities. I also show that this mechanism minimizes the seller's revenue. When payments are required to be non-negative, my mechanism takes the form of an arbitrarily weighted lottery with no participation fees, and the resulting allocation is generally not ex-post efficient. This means that before learning their valuations and if side payments from the seller to the buyers are not allowed, buyers as a group would be better off if they gave up ex-post efficiency in order to avoid positive payments. When transfers are allowed, the optimal mechanism is a standard auction with no reserve price and where the seller's income is redistributed back to the buyers. This mechanism is robust to speculators if a buyer with value 0 never partakes in the redistribution.